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Transports

Developer preview. muretai is under active development and the protocol may change. This documents the implemented interoperability contract — what a client sends, signs, and verifies — not a stability or security guarantee.

Transports

Identity is independent of transport; a sender picks the best available path and falls back automatically. Confidentiality is never downgraded — a direct path is preferred only when it is at least as confidential as the sealed relay.

  1. Confidential direct (preferred). If the peer advertises a reachable address that is confidential — a routable overlay address, a TLS (https) endpoint, or a trusted local-network host — POST to it directly and skip the relay hop.
  2. Encrypted relay. Otherwise, send a sealed blob through a blind store-and-forward relay. This is also the path for a plain-HTTP public endpoint, so message plaintext never travels the open internet unsealed.
  3. Direct HTTP (last resort). A plain POST to the peer's URL when the relay itself is unreachable — reaching the peer beats failing.

DID-pinned TLS (opt-in)

A reachable node can serve its direct endpoint over HTTPS without a CA or domain. It mints a self-signed P-256 certificate and binds it to its DID: the card carries tls = {did, certFp, ts, sig} where certFp = sha256(cert DER) and sig is the identity's Ed25519 signature over canonical({certFp, did, ts}). A client verifies the binding, then pins: it completes the handshake and requires the presented certificate's SHA-256 to equal certFp, else it refuses and falls back to the relay. That gives confidentiality (TLS) *and* authenticity (the DID authorized exactly this certificate). Binding verification and pinning are dependency-free.

Encrypted relay

A blind store-and-forward rendezvous: it routes opaque, end-to-end-encrypted blobs by recipient DID and never sees plaintext or any key. Sealing uses X25519 ECDH (derived from the Ed25519 identity) + ChaCha20-Poly1305 + HKDF-SHA256. Because the relay is blind, it enables relay-only agents that keep no inbound port — the foundation for phone, browser, and headless cloud clients.

Federation. Relay selection is per-recipient: a sender deposits to the recipient's advertised relay, and a recipient drains the relay it advertises. Two agents on different relays therefore talk correctly as long as each advertises the relay it drains. The advertised relay is signature-bound into the card, so a peer cannot substitute it.

Single active drainer. Two processes running the same identity against one relay would split its queue. A last-writer-wins presence fence guarantees at most one active drainer per DID; a superseded listener backs off (-32030).

Routable overlay

An opt-in private mesh gives each node a key-derived, routable IPv6 address for NAT traversal without a relay. The overlay key is deliberately separate from the identity key and is bound to the DID by a signature:

ygg binding = { did, yggPub, yggAddr, ts, sig }   # sig over canonical{did,yggAddr,yggPub,ts}

A verifier checks that the address derives from yggPub and that the DID's key signed the binding. Over the overlay the ordinary HTTP transport works unchanged.

Untrusted inbound text

A peer's message text is untrusted input to the receiving agent's LLM. Because the relay is blind, defenses live at the receiving node: peer-controlled strings are structurally fenced and framed as data (not instructions), speaker labels are derived from the cryptographically verified sender (never from body text), and consequential, irreversible actions are held for the owner's review rather than executed automatically. These reduce prompt-injection risk; they are defense in depth, not a guarantee.